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I. INTRODUCTION

You requested for me to draft supermajority class voting
provisions that you will insert in our client Fight the Rona, Inc.’s (the
“Corporation”) Certificate of Designations. The Certificate of
Designations will establish a new series of preferred stock (the “Series A
Preferred Stock”), which will be issued to certain investors. Attached at
the end of this memorandum are draft provisions (“Rider A”), a glossary
defining certain terms in Rider A, and an appendix.
This memorandum provides the information you asked me to
provide in three parts. First, this memorandum provides the transactional
context, including relevant facts pertaining to the parties, each party’s
requests, and the transaction. Second, this memorandum identifies the
three most important legal issues I encountered while drafting Rider A,
and it explains my proposed solutions and analysis. Finally, this
memorandum discusses minor drafting decisions reflected in Rider A as
well as other factors our firm should consider regarding this transaction.
* Judicial Law Clerk, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee | Juris Doctor, the University of Tennessee College of Law | Bachelor of
Science in Business Administration: Economics and Finance, the University of Tennessee
at Martin. The author expresses sincere thanks to Professor Joan Heminway for her
unwavering assistance in developing this memorandum. The author also expresses thanks
to the editors and staff of Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law for their editing
efforts. The author specifically thanks Hannah-Claire Boggess, Patrick Clarke, Jonathan
Davis, Matt Napolitano, Sam Rule, and Alex Sosnowski for their outstanding editing.
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II. TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT
We represent the Corporation, which retained our law firm to
represent it in negotiations related to the authorization and issuance of
shares of the Series A Preferred Stock to Alexander Hamilton, Aaron Burr,
Maria Reynolds, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison (the “Investors”).
The Investors are business-sophisticated individuals who live in Delaware
and who have participated in joint ventures together in the past. The
Corporation is a privately held Delaware corporation. The Corporation
was founded in early 2021 with the purpose to invent, produce, and
disseminate a COVID-19 vaccine. While the Corporation only recently
started Phase One testing, many of its competitors have commenced
Phase Three testing or received limited approval.
The Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation authorizes
10,000,000 shares of a single class of common stock, par value $0.01 per
share. One million of these shares are outstanding and held by twentyfive individual stockholders who are unrelated to the Corporation’s
directors and officers. The Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation also
authorizes 10,000,000 shares of a single class of preferred stock, par value
$0.01 per share. None of these shares are outstanding. However, the
Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation contains a blank check
provision that permits the Corporation’s board of directors to unilaterally
designate and issue new series of preferred stock to the fullest extent that
§ 151 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware allows.1
An excerpt of the Corporation’s blank check provision is in Appendix A.
The Corporation has no outstanding debt other than current liabilities
associated with its short-term operations.
The Corporation needs additional funding for research and
development, and its directors are considering establishing a new series of
preferred stock. The Corporation considered, but decided against, issuing
debt because it prefers to avoid the fixed costs that accompany debt
instruments. The Corporation equally considered but decided against
issuing additional shares of common stock because the Corporation’s
common stockholders have expressed their desire to retain their current
voting power with respect to electing the Corporation’s directors. Thus,
the Corporation intends to designate and issue 500,000 shares of a new

1

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (West 2017).
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series of preferred stock, par value $0.01 per share (i.e., the Series A
Preferred Stock), and issue most if not all of these shares to the Investors.
The Investors are negotiating with the Corporation to purchase
the Series A Preferred Stock in consideration for cash through a private
placement under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended.2 However, the Investors have reservations. The Investors are
concerned about the Corporation’s inherently risky operations and that
the Corporation is lagging behind its competitors. To hedge their risk, the
Investors demand limited control over the Corporation’s future decisions
that would affect their investments. Specifically, they demand unanimous
(or as a second preference, high-percentage supermajority) voting rights
for any decision that would dissolve or result in a merger involving the
Corporation or that would adversely affect their shares. Moreover, the
Investors demand transfer restrictions on their shares to protect these
voting rights. The Corporation is in dire need of funding, so it is willing
to grant the Investors these rights.3 We are currently drafting the first draft
of the Corporation’s Certificate of Designations, which will establish the
Series A Preferred Stock. I am drafting the supermajority class voting
provisions.4
Delaware law5 authorizes this transaction. A corporation may
authorize new series of preferred stock6 in its certificate of incorporation,
a certificate of designations, or by board resolution pursuant to authority
expressly granted to the board in the certificate of incorporation.7 Full,
limited, or no voting rights may accompany the new series of preferred
stock.8 Pertinently, these rights may require that shareholders of the new
series approve certain transactions before the corporation engages in those

2 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2015). The Series A Preferred Stock will not be registered.
Another associate in our firm is handing the Section 4(a)(2) exemption issue.
3 Importantly, providing the Investors these rights will not dilute the common
stockholders’ power to elect directors.
4 Other members of our firm are drafting the other portions of the Certificate of
Designations.
5 The Corporation and the Investors agree Delaware law governs this transaction because
the Corporation is incorporated in Delaware. See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v.
Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005) (“[O]nly one state [has] authority to
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs – the state of incorporation.”).
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a); see also id. § 102(a)(4).
7 See 1 BRADLEY W. VOSS, VOSS ON DELAWARE CONTRACT LAW § 6.19 (2021).
8 Id.
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transactions.9 Furthermore, these voting provisions may require a
supermajority percentage of votes.10 Because there is no public market for
the Corporation’s securities, stock exchange rules do not apply to the
issuance of the Series A Preferred Stock.11
Set forth in the next Part are key issues I encountered in drafting
the supermajority voting provisions. I note in advance I used Goldman
Sachs, Group, Inc.’s (“Goldman”) Certificate of Designations12 as my
model precedent transaction document because: (1) I located no negative
litigation history related to the document; (2) the language used in
Goldman’s Certificate of Designations is similar to the language used in
voting provisions in numerous other precedent documents;13 and (3)
Goldman’s Certificate of Designations covers transactions similar to the
transactions that Rider A covers.14 Also, for purposes of Part III.2 below,
you should be aware that the Corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation
contains an exculpation provision.15

Id.; see also Seibert v. Gulton Indus., No. 5631, 1979 WL 2710, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. June
21, 1979), aff’d mem., 414 A.2d 822 (Del. 1980); 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A.
FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 5.6 (4th ed. 2021).
10 See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, § 7.24 (citing Seibert, 1979 WL 2710, at *3–
4). But see infra Part III.1.
11 Though, as discussed in Part IV, the Corporation should consider relevant stock
exchange rules.
12 Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Certificate of Designations (Form 8–K Exhibit 3.1 and 4.1)
(Nov. 1, 2017).
13 To determine this similarity, I used Bloomberg Law’s “Run Draft Analyzer” feature.
Nearly 1,000 precedent documents use language similar to Goldman’s Certificate of
Designations, and the language in those documents is 85–98% similar to the language in
Goldman’s Certificate of Designations. As I drafted Rider A, I edited it to reflect the
most common language among all precedent documents. For example, Goldman’s title
for its provision that is the equivalent of Section 7(b) in Rider A is “Other Voting Rights.”
Nevertheless, I entitled Section 7(b) “Class Voting Rights as to Particular Matters”
because the majority of precedent documents use that phrasing.
14 Because the Investors desire the right to approve by supermajority vote any sale by the
Corporation of substantially all of its assets, Section 7(b)(iv) in Rider A provides the
Investors this right. However, Goldman’s supermajority voting provisions do not apply
to asset sales, so I obtained the model language for Section 7(b)(iv) from another
Delaware corporation’s certificate of designations. See MDU Res. Grp., Inc., Certificate
of Incorporation (Form 10–K Exhibit 3.A) (Nov. 3, 1994).
15 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2020). Similarly, we should be aware and
inform the board of the terms of the indemnification provision in the Corporation’s
Certificate of Designation and availability of insurance.
9
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III. KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND CORRESPONDING ANALYSIS
This Part identifies the three most important issues I encountered
when drafting the supermajority class voting provisions. It also provides
my proposed solutions and analysis for these issues.
1. Maximum Legally Permissible Supermajority Percentage
The Investors’ demand for unanimous or high supermajority
voting rights presents the question of whether those voting rights are valid.
Rider A addresses this issue by requiring a vote of the holders of at least
80% of the shares of the Series A Preferred Stock to approve the covered
transactions because 80% is the highest percentage Delaware courts have
explicitly held is valid.16
Although supermajority class votes are generally authorized by
Delaware law,17 there is a dispute whether unanimous (or nearly
unanimous) supermajority percentages are valid.18 This is so because high
supermajority voting provisions: (1) are “practically irreplaceable” in that
they require a nearly unanimous vote to be amended;19 and (2) may violate
public policy because they grant a small group of shareholders a veto
power over certain corporate actions, and this veto power contravenes the
notion that corporations should have representative governments.20
See generally Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923 (Del. 1990).
See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, § 7.24 (citing Seibert v. Gulton Indus., No.
5631, 1979 WL 2710, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979), aff’d mem., 414 A.2d 822 (Del.
1980)).
18 See Acquicor Tech. Inc., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2006 WL 8217485 (Oct. 19, 2006);
Caterpillar, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2017 WL 446952 (Mar. 28, 2017); BALOTTI
& FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, § 5.6; BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, § 7.24 (citing
Seibert, 1979 WL 2710, at *3–4); Sellers v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 2 A.2d 108, 114
(Del. Ch. 1938); F. Hodge O’Neal, Restrictions on Transfer Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REV. 773, 786 (1952) (citing Sellers); Statutory Assistance
for Closely Held Corporations, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1498 n.3 (1958) (citing Sellers). But see
Roland Park Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Hendler, 109 A.2d 753, 758 (Md. 1954) (holding the
statute expressly permits unanimous voting provisions because they are merely
supermajority provisions).
19 Sellers, 2 A.2d at 114.
20 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Provision in Charter or Bylaw
Requiring Supermajority Vote, 80 A.L.R. 4th 667 n.6 (1990).
16

17
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Consequently, we must consider how to grant the Investors’
demand of high supermajority or unanimous voting rights without
violating the law. True, it is unclear whether unanimous voting
requirements are per se invalid, but we should avoid unnecessary risks.
Therefore, Rider A provides for an 80% voting requirement.21 I
considered using a 67% or 75% requirement, both which drafters
commonly use.22 However, I decided to implement an 80% requirement
because the Investors desire the highest supermajority percentage
possible, and the Delaware Supreme Court has upheld 80% supermajority
voting requirements.23 Also, numerous precedent documents comfortably
require 80% votes.24 Additionally, here, a voting requirement over 80%
would practically require unanimity (and therefore possibly be void on
policy grounds) because there will initially be only five investors.25 Finally,
I could locate no precedent documents that require a percentage higher
than 80%; perhaps other drafters utilize percentages lower than 80% for
similar reasons.26
2. Compliance with Fiduciary Duties
Board action implementing supermajority voting rights may
constitute a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties.27 This issue arises
when directors do not exercise due care28 or when their “primary purpose”
for implementing the provisions is to interfere with shareholders’

See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.30 (Rev. 3d ed. 2021) (“If there is
any doubt about the acceptance of unanimity requirements . . . the drafter may be well
advised to use a [] high percentage requirement rather than a [unanimous
requirement].”).
22 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp., Certificate of Incorporation (Form 10–Q Exhibit 3–A)
(Oct. 28, 2019) (“67%”).
23 Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 927–28 (Del. 1990).
24 See, e.g., CTI Indus. Corp., Certificate of Designations (Form 8–K Exhibit 3.1) (Jan. 3,
2020); Foamex Int’l Inc., Certificate of Designations (Form 10–Q Exhibit 4) (May 9,
2008).
25 Zitter, supra note 20.
26 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Co., Certificate of Designations (Form 8–K Exhibit 4.1) (Aug. 7,
2009) (“66 2/3%”).
27 See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–60 (Del. Ch. 1988); BALOTTI
& FINKELSTEIN, supra note 9, §§ 6.41, 7.24.
28 1 BRENT A. OLSEN, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK § 3.16 (May
2021 ed. 2021).
21
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franchise.29 To address this issue, we should properly inform the directors
how to comply with their duties.
Supermajority class voting provisions invoke duty of loyalty
concerns because directors breach their duty of loyalty when they enact
the provisions in bad faith or when doing so is not in their corporation’s
best interests.30 What is more, if challenged, courts review directors’
decisions to enact the provisions under the exacting Blasius standard.
Applying Blasius, courts first determine whether the directors acted with
the “primary purpose” of marginalizing shareholders’ voting rights.31 If so,
courts will hold the directors did not violate their duty of loyalty only if
the directors can demonstrate they had a “compelling justification” for
implementing the provisions.32 To ensure the Corporation’s directors
comply with their duty of loyalty, we should ensure the directors consider:
(1) the Corporation’s dire need for financing; and (2) whether the
Corporation’s need for financing outweighs the risk that the supermajority
provisions will cause deadlock if the Investors dissent from an action all
other stockholders wish to take.33 These considerations will also ensure
the directors likely receive business judgment rule deference rather than
Blasius review because they show the directors’ primary purpose for
enacting the provisions was the good faith management of the company.34
And even if a court were to apply Blasius review, a court reviewing the
record would likely hold the Corporation’s need for financing was a
“compelling justification.”35
Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 186 (Del. Ch. 1993).
OLSEN, supra note 28, § 3.1.
31 See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659–60.
32 OLSEN, supra note 28, § 3.29. The policy for Blasius review is that, by their nature,
supermajority class voting provisions disenfranchise other stockholders in that even if all
other stockholders’ consent to a specific transaction, the transaction may not occur
without a high-percentage vote by the class. See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d
293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000).
33 See Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 320 (“Absent confessions of an improper purpose, the most
important evidence of what a board intended to do is often what effects its actions
have.”). This is especially important given that the voting percentage requirement in Rider
A is as high as 80%.
34 See id. at 322 (explaining when a board acts with a legitimate purpose, Blasius does not
apply).
35 The board in Blasius acted with the primary purpose of “thwarting the exercise of a
shareholder vote.” See id. at 320. In contrast, the board in this proposed example is acting
in good faith based on the need for financing.
29
30
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The directors’ duty of care requires that the directors consider all
material information reasonably available regarding the effects enacting
the supermajority voting provisions will have on the Corporation.36 The
directors will breach their duty of care––and under the business judgment
rule, courts will only question the directors’ decision––if they are grossly
negligent in failing to consider this information.37 To ensure the
Corporation’s directors satisfy their duty of care, the directors should
consider: (1) our and other expert opinion suggesting the supermajority
voting provisions are necessary; and (2) securing common shareholder
approval of the provisions. Note, though, the Corporation’s Certificate of
Incorporation includes an exculpation provision, so it is unlikely the
directors will be liable for breaching their duty of care. Thus, we should
focus on ensuring the directors satisfy their duty of loyalty. Of course,
along the way, for purposes of both their duties of loyalty and care, the
directors should ensure the Corporation’s board meeting minutes and
other records reflect their deep consideration of their alternatives, choices,
and reasoning.38
3. Including “whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise” in the
Adverse Amendment Provision
Voting provisions often require holders of a specific series of stock
to approve any amendment to the corporate charter that would adversely
affect the holders of that series (an “Adverse Amendment Provision”).
The Delaware Supreme Court narrowly construes the transactions these
provisions cover absent a specific phrase. Rider A resolves this issue by
including the phrase: “whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise.”
The Delaware Supreme Court in Avatex held an Adverse
Amendment Provision will not require a class vote if the amendment
adversely affecting the holders is caused by a merger or consolidation
unless the provision includes the phrase “whether by merger,

OLSEN, supra note 28, § 3.16.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
38 See generally Chesapeake, 771 A.2d 293 (criticizing directors who did not consider the
consequences of enacting supermajority voting provisions); Lyman P.Q. Johnson &
Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 663 (2007). The time of board deliberations, too, can have bearing on whether
courts hold that directors have breached their fiduciary duties. See Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et
al., Takeover Defense: Mergers and Acquisitions § 3.04 (8th ed. 2018).
36
37
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consolidation or otherwise.”39 Importantly, the Avatex court and other
courts that addressed the issue after Avatex explained that drafters who
desire to have merger and consolidation transactions covered by their
Adverse Amendment Provisions should include this phrase’s language
verbatim.40
Here, because the Investors demand supermajority voting rights
for all transactions that would adversely affect their shares, Rider A (in
Section 7(b)(ii)) contains an Adverse Amendment Provision to require
80% of the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock to approve any
transaction that adversely affects them. Meanwhile, Rider A (in Section
7(b)(iii)) contains a provision that requires the holders to approve most
mergers and consolidations. However, it is notable that Section 7(b)(iii)
explicitly exempts certain mergers and consolidations from the
supermajority vote requirement. Thus, if we exclude the above phrase
from Section 7(b)(ii), a court could interpret that section to not require a
class vote in the case of a merger that adversely affects the holders of the
Series A Preferred Stock but that is exempted by Section 7(b)(iii).
The drafting alternatives are clear: We can include or omit the
pertinent phrase in Section 7(b)(ii) in Rider A. I include the phrase, relying
on the Delaware Supreme Court’s and other scholars’ advice.41 Doing so
is consistent with all parties’ interests because the Investors demand broad
authority to vote in merger transactions, and the Corporation is willing to
grant this authority.
IV.

MINOR DRAFTING DECISIONS AND OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS

Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 847–55 (Del. 1998).
Id. at 855 (“The path for future drafters . . . is clear. When a certificate [omits the
phrase], the preferred have no class vote [in the event of merger or consolidation
transactions.]”). See generally Warner Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 583 A.2d
962, 967–71 (Del. Ch. 1989) (holding a class vote was not required when the voting
provisions omitted the phrase “whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise”);
Benchmark Cap. Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. Civ.A. 19719, 2002 WL 1732423, at *7–
9 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), aff’d, 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003). Indeed, these cases do not
differ even in their omission of an oxford comma from the phrase, and for this reason,
Rider A omits oxford commas despite our firm’s policy to generally include them. See,
e.g., Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *8–9.
41 See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation
of Venture Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 843–44 (2004).
39

40
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In addition to these considerations and those we discussed during
our meetings, this Part contains a list of less noteworthy drafting decisions
and topics our firm should consider. Here is the list:
!
!
!
!
!
!

While most relevant precedent transactions documents use the word
“such” throughout their provisions, I have replaced the word “such”
with “the” in Rider A to follow firm preference.
We should consider the requirement that voting provisions be “clear
and unambiguous.”42
We should consider the requirement that preferred stock have
liquidation or dividend preferences for preferred stock supermajority
voting provisions to be valid.43
We should consider the effect Rider A’s voting provisions will have
on the Corporation’s ability to list the Series A Preferred Stock on a
stock exchange in the future.44
We should consider whether to use the word form of 80% (i.e., “eighty
percent”) rather than its numerical alternative (i.e., “80%”) in defining
the supermajority percentage.45
I omitted a materiality requirement from Section 7(b)(ii) because the
Investors demand broad authority to approve all transactions that
adversely affect them.46

See Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 926–27 (Del. 1990)
(holding provisions similar to those in Rider A were clear and unambiguous).
43 See Nat’l Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., C. A. No. 7278, 1983 WL 18035, at *4
(Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983).
44 For example, New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) Listing Rules explain that the
NYSE has a preference against preferred stock supermajority voting provisions that
require supermajority approval of mergers or acquisitions. See NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 703.05(A). But see id. § 703.05(E) (providing
exceptions). See generally id. § 313.00(C) (discussing minimum voting rights required for
listed preferred stock).
45 Compare Citizens Fin. Grp., Certificate of Incorporation (Form 8–K Exhibit 3.1) (Apr.
23, 2020) (“two-thirds”), with Bank of Am. Corp., Certificate of Incorporation (Form 10–
Q Exhibit 3–A) (Oct. 28, 2019) (“67%”).
46 The previous language from Goldman’s Certificate of Designations required a
supermajority vote only when amendments, alterations, or repeals would be “material
and adverse” rather than merely “adverse.”
42
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RIDER A
Section 7. Voting Rights
(a) General. The holders of the Series A Preferred Stock shall not have
any voting rights except as set forth below or as otherwise from time to
time required by law.
(b) Class Voting Rights as to Particular Matters. So long as any shares
of the Series A Preferred Stock are outstanding, in addition to any other
vote or consent of stockholders required by law or otherwise by the
Certificate of Incorporation, the vote or consent of the holders of at least
80% of the shares of the Series A Preferred Stock at the time outstanding
and entitled to vote, voting together as a separate class, given in person or
by proxy, either in writing without a meeting or by vote at any meeting
called for the purpose, shall be necessary for authorizing, approving or
ratifying:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

any amendment or alteration of the Certificate of
Incorporation to:
(A) increase the number of authorized shares of Senior
Stock;
(B) authorize, designate or otherwise create shares of
Senior Stock; or
(C) authorize, designate or otherwise create any shares or
securities convertible into or exchangeable or
exercisable for shares of Senior Stock;
any amendment, alteration or repeal, whether by merger,
consolidation or otherwise, of any provision of the
Certificate of Incorporation so as to adversely affect the
special rights, preferences, privileges or voting powers of
the Series A Preferred Stock, taken as a whole;
any reclassification involving the Series A Preferred Stock
or merger or consolidation of the Corporation with
another corporation or other entity, unless in each case (x)
the shares of the Series A Preferred Stock remain
outstanding or, in the case of any merger or consolidation
in which the Corporation is not the surviving or resulting
entity, are converted into or exchanged for preference
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securities of the surviving or resulting entity or its ultimate
parent, and (y) the shares remaining outstanding or the
preference securities, as the case may be, have rights,
preferences, privileges and voting powers, and limitations
and restrictions that, taken as a whole, are not materially
less favorable to the holders of the Series A Preferred
Stock than the rights, preferences, privileges and voting
powers, and limitations and restrictions of the Series A
Preferred Stock immediately prior to the reclassification,
merger or consolidation, taken as a whole; or
the voluntary dissolution, liquidation or winding up of the
affairs of the Corporation, or the sale, lease or conveyance
by the Corporation of all or substantially all its property or
assets;

provided, however, that for all purposes of this Section 7(b), the creation and
issuance, or an increase in the number of authorized or issued shares, of
any other series of Preferred Stock ranking equally with or junior to the
Series A Preferred Stock with respect to the payment of dividends
(whether the dividends are cumulative or non-cumulative) or the
distribution of assets upon liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the
Corporation will not be deemed to adversely affect the rights, preferences,
privileges or voting powers of the Series A Preferred Stock.
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GLOSSARY47
“Certificate of Incorporation” means the certificate of incorporation of
the Corporation, as it may be amended from time to time, and shall include
this Certificate of Designations.
“Corporation” means Fight the Rona, Inc, a corporation validly organized
and existing under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.
“Preferred Stock” means any and all series of the preferred stock of the
Corporation, including the Series A Preferred Stock.
“Senior Stock” means any class or series of capital stock of the
Corporation ranking senior to the Series A Preferred Stock with respect
to either or both the payment of dividends or the distribution of assets
upon any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Corporation.
“Series A Preferred Stock” means the series of preferred stock, par value
$0.01 per share, that this Certificate of Designations establishes.

These defined terms appear in Rider A, so I define them here for your convenience. I
expect the Corporation’s Certificate of Designations will define each of these terms
similarly.
47
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APPENDIX A
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
OF
FIGHT THE RONA, INC.
*****
ARTICLE 4
CAPITAL STOCK
Section 4.01. Authorized Shares.
(a) Classes of Stock. [Omitted]
(b) Preferred Stock. The Board of Directors is hereby empowered, without
any action or vote by the Corporation’s stockholders (except as may
otherwise be provided by the terms of any class or series of Preferred
Stock then outstanding), to authorize by resolution or resolutions from
time to time the issuance of one or more classes or series of Preferred
Stock and to fix the corresponding rights, preferences, privileges and
restrictions, including dividend rights, dividend rates, conversion rights,
voting rights, terms of redemptions, redemption prices and liquidation
preferences with respect to each such class or series of Preferred Stock
and the number of shares constituting each such class or series, and to
increase or decrease the number of shares of any such class or series to
the extent permitted by Delaware law.
*****

